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fMRICounterfactual thinking is ubiquitous in everyday life and an important aspect of cognition and emotion.
Although counterfactual thought has been argued to differ from processing factual or hypothetical informa-
tion, imaging data which elucidate these differences on a neural level are still scarce. We investigated the
neural correlates of processing counterfactual sentences under visual and aural presentation. We compared
conditionals in subjunctive mood which explicitly contradicted previously presented facts (i.e. counterfactuals)
to conditionals framed in indicative moodwhich did not contradict factual world knowledge and thus conveyed
a hypothetical supposition. Our results show activation in right occipital cortex (cuneus) and right basal ganglia
(caudate nucleus) during counterfactual sentence processing. Importantly the occipital activation is not only
present under visual presentation but also with purely auditory stimulus presentation, precluding a visual
processing artifact. Thus our results can be interpreted as reﬂecting the fact that counterfactual conditionals
pragmatically imply the relevance of keeping inmind both factual and supposed information whereas the hypo-
thetical conditionals imply that real world information is irrelevant for processing the conditional and can be
omitted. The need to sustain representations of factual and suppositional events during counterfactual sentence
processing requires increased mental imagery and integration efforts. Our ﬁndings are compatible with predic-
tions based on mental model theory.
© 2013 Elsevier Inc. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license. Introduction
Counterfactuals describe events or states of the world that have not
occurred and implicitly or explicitly contradict factual world knowledge.
Counterfactual thinking is ubiquitous in everyday life and relevant for
both cognition and emotion. People utter counterfactuals to indicate
causal relations (Woodward, 2011) and to convey logical arguments
(e.g. reductio ad absurdum). Counterfactual thinking is further necessary
to express relief or regret (Kahneman andMiller, 1986), which is a moti-
vational precondition for learning frommistakes and a form of emotional
regulation (Markman et al., 1993). Some languages offer linguistic
markers to clarify that an utterance is dealingwith counterfactual suppo-
sitions: In English and German, subjunctive mood distinguishes counter-
factual conditionals from those which do not imply real-world violations
but rather have true (we might call them ‘factuals’) or undetermined
truth-values of their antecedents (further referred to as ‘hypotheticals’)
and which usually are stated in indicative mood.
Counterfactuals have been a topic in cognitive, social, and devel-
opmental psychology as well as linguistics for several decades and
recently have received attention in psycho-linguistics (de Vega and
Urrutia, 2012; de Vega et al., 2007; Ferguson, 2012; Ferguson andand Centre for Neurocognitive
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kova).
NC-ND license. Sanford, 2008; Ferguson et al., 2008; Nieuwland, 2012, 2013;
Nieuwland and Martin, 2012; Urrutia et al., 2012a, 2012b). In the
cognitive domain of reasoning, mental model theory developed by
Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991) is probably the most prominent ac-
count that argues for a substantial difference between counterfactual
and hypothetical conditional representation. Following Fillenbaum
(1974), mental model theory proposes that subjects represent coun-
terfactuals (e.g. If it had rained then the street would be wet) by
constructing two distinct mental models: one for the literally uttered
suppositional event (counterfactual: rain and wet street), and another
one for the opposing factual event which is implicitly conveyed
(factual: no rain and dry street) (Byrne, 2002). Hypotheticals, on the
other hand (e.g. If it rained then the street was wet), only activate
the suppositional model (rain and wet street), making no statement
about factual events. Behavioral investigations support the notion of
differential representations, showing that conditionals presented in
past tense and subjunctive mood (i.e. counterfactuals) lead subjects
to think of different implications and make different inferences than
conditionals in past tense and indicative mood (i.e. hypotheticals). In
particular, framing conditionals (If A then B) counterfactually increases
the acceptance rate of negated suppositional events (¬A and ¬B) aswell
as thewillingness to accept Modus Tollens (A→B, ¬B Therefore ¬A) but
also the logically invalid deduction of Denying the Antecedent (A→B,
¬A Therefore ¬B). Both types of inferences are facilitated by the repre-
sentation of factual events (¬A and ¬B), which is not triggered when
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Byrne and Tasso, 1999; Egan et al., 2009; Quelhas and Byrne, 2003;
Thompson and Byrne, 2002).
However, results from paper and pencil tests do not clarify whether
the construction of differential mental models occurs online during
premise processing or with some delay in the course of implication
and inference evaluation. Support for the view of an automatic and
instantaneous activation of a factual model alongside the suppositional
counterfactual model comes from reading-time investigations where
subjects are not required to perform inferences but only read a text.
Counterfactual but not hypothetical conditionals (If A then B) were
shown to prime the opposing real-world model (¬A and ¬B), resulting
in decreased reading times for subsequently stated events of ¬A and
¬B (Gomez-Veiga et al., 2010; Santamaria et al., 2005). Interestingly,
this priming effect also worked the other way round: the antecedent
of counterfactual conditionals (If A …) was read faster when subjects
previously were introduced to the fact that ¬A (as opposed to the infor-
mation that A). However, no difference in reading time occurred when
the same informationwas conveyed in indicativemood, suggesting that
factual world events were only activated by the counterfactual, but not
by the hypothetical antecedent (Stewart et al., 2009).
Thus there is evidence indicating that the pragmatic implications
of counterfactuals differ from those of hypotheticals in the sense
that counterfactuals trigger an instantaneous co-activation of factual
world knowledge alongside suppositional content. This knowledge
affects online sentence processing, and in the long run results in
different reasoning performance. In contrast, hypotheticals activate
only one suppositional representation. On the basis of present evi-
dence one would expect counterfactual and hypothetical conditionals
to differ on a neural level during online sentence processing. In partic-
ular mental model theory, in which mental models are understood to
be iconic representations of states or events, predicts differences in
occipital brain regions where visual association processes and mental
imagery take place (Knauff et al., 2003). Since counterfactuals are
supposed to require more models than hypothetical conditionals these
areas should be more strongly activated by counterfactual than by
hypothetical conditionals.
However, no imaging study has targeted this prediction directly.
Only one recent fMRI investigation offers a ﬁrst glance into the neural
basis of counterfactual sentence processing. Nieuwland (2012) used
counterfactual conditionals to evaluate the effect of local context
on truth value processing. He contrasted historical counterfactuals
(If N.A.S.A had not developed its Apollo Project, the ﬁrst country to
land on the moon would have been …) to factual historical state-
ments (Because N.A.S.A has developed its Apollo Project, the ﬁrst
country to land on the moon was …). The main effect of context
(Counterfactual>Factual) showed increased bilateral activation in
middle temporal gyri. Yet it is not clear from the reported stimulus
material whether participants evaluated the presented historical
counterfactual antecedents in respect to their factual world knowl-
edge or only in a suppositional (hence hypothetical) way. Strong
support for a hypothetical interpretation are the ERP results that
Nieuwland and Martin (2012) obtained with the same stimulus
material: there was no indication of a world-knowledge effect on
the N400 during processing of contextually congruent (but factually
false) target words embedded in counterfactual conditionals. This result
is at odds with prior ERP investigations which reported inﬂuences of
real-world knowledge on the N400 in counterfactual local contexts
using stimulus material with strong real world salience (If cats were
vegetarian …) (Ferguson et al., 2008; but see Nieuwland, 2013 for an
alternative explanation of diverging results). Although truth value and
context showed an interaction in neural activity during the presentation
of the critical word at the conclusion in the fMRI-study, it is still possible
that subjects took account of their real-world knowledge only when the
conclusion was presented, triggered by the violation of a potentially
strong association of context and critical continuation which is storedand automatically accessed from general world knowledge (e.g. ﬁrst
country on the moon— America). If subjects did not consider their factual
knowledge regarding the presented counterfactual antecedents, the
context effect observed by Nieuwland (2012) would reﬂect the neu-
ral difference between factual and hypothetical statements, rather
than the contrast between counterfactual and factual statements.
In any case, to bring out the neural activation speciﬁc to counterfac-
tual thinking it would be preferable to not only contrast counterfactuals
with factuals but also with hypotheticals. Hypothetical, similar to coun-
terfactual conditionals provide a supposition rather than a factual event
and therefore havematching ontological status. Moreover, hypothetical
and counterfactual conditionals both have the form of if–then state-
ments instead of using temporal conjunctions like since or because.
The only remaining difference is that hypothetical conditionals lack
the counterfactuals' (explicit or implicit) antagonism to factual events,
the hallmark of counterfactuality.
The present study was designed to implement this speciﬁc com-
parison. We presented counterfactual and hypothetical conditionals
which were preceded by a sentence describing the factual state of
events. This rendered our counterfactuals explicitly counter-to-fact
which had an important beneﬁt: It ensured that subjects took into
account factual world knowledge and did not interpret the counter-
factuals in a hypothetical way, as may have been the case with the
stimulus material of Nieuwland (2012). To hold propositional content
identical we presented the same fact-sentence in both counterfactual
and hypothetical conditions (The motor is switched off today.). The
suppositional content of the following counterfactual antecedent
(If the motor had been switched on today, …) coincided temporally
with opposing factual world events, resulting in an explicit antagonism.
The hypothetical conditional, however, stated the same proposition but
for a different time (If the motor was switched on yesterday, …) thus
avoiding contradiction and leaving the truth value of the antecedent
undetermined. To rule out primary perceptual confounds caused by
inevitable sentence-length differences between counterfactual and
hypothetical conditionals (due to the additional use of auxiliary verbs
in subjunctivemood), stimulus sentences were presented in two differ-
ent modalities, visually and aurally.
Material and methods
Participants
The sample included 21 healthy, right-handed volunteers (11 female)
aged between 19 and 32 years (M=24.2, SD=5.7) with normal or
corrected-to-normal vision. All were native German speakers with no
history of neurological disorders. The subjects were recruited via online
advertisement and gave informed consent before scanning. They were
paid 10€ for participation.
Stimuli
The experimental material consisted of written and spoken
German sentences. As can be seen in Table 1, in the counterfactual
(CF) condition the ﬁrst sentence described a factual physical event
taking place today or yesterday (The motor is switched off today.).
The second clause was formulated as a conditional interrogative
sentence in subjunctive mood. Its antecedent described the opposite
event taking place at the same time (If the motor had been switched
on today, …), followed by a physical consequence that could (or
could not) follow from the antecedent (… would it have burned
fuel?). Negation was either implemented by direct ‘not’-introduction
(e.g. burning vs. not burning) or by using antagonistic verbs or adverbs
(e.g. off vs. on).
The hypothetical (HYP) trials were composed of a fact-sentence
identical to the counterfactual condition (The motor is switched off
today.). The subsequent conditional, however, was phrased in indicative
Fig. 1. Schematic illustration of stimulus onsets for both modalities. Axis indicates time
in milliseconds.
Table 1
Examples of experimental trials.
German original English translation
CF Der Motor ist heute aus. The motor is switched off today.
Wenn der Motor heute an wäre, … If the motor had been switched
on today, …
…würde er dann Treibstoff verbrauchen? … would it have burned fuel?
HYP Der Motor ist heute aus. The motor is switched off today.
Wenn der Motor gestern an war, … If the motor was switched on
yesterday, …
… hat er dann Treibstoff verbraucht? … did it burn fuel?
Counterfactual (CF) and hypothetical (HYP) conditions. Bold and underlined font are
used for clarity but were not used during stimulus presentation.
267E. Kulakova et al. / NeuroImage 72 (2013) 265–271mood and described the opposite event taking place in a different time
compared to the ﬁrst sentence (either today/yesterday or yesterday/
today). The hypothetically supposed antecedent (If the motor was
switched on yesterday, …) was followed by a consequent indicating
the same possible (or impossible) outcome as in the counterfactual
condition (… did it burn fuel?). The temporal alternation allowed us to
closely match propositional content of CF and HYP stimuli. However,
it also introduced the confounding factor of temporal change in HYP.
If present, we expected the potential process of adapting to temporal
change to be reﬂected in the contrast HYP>CF only, thus not affecting
our contrast of interest (CF>HYP).
In order to allow simple rating with no demand of context-speciﬁc
knowledge, the conditionals described stable physical (piano key
pressed — tone generated), technical (cooker on — stove top hot), and
chemical (noodles cooked— become soft) relations which are available
from general knowledge. Note that the acceptability of the relations
was not affected by our manipulation. The only difference between
conditions was the explicit contradiction between fact-sentence and
antecedent in the CF condition which was missing in HYP conditions.
This ensured that reasoning (i.e. conclusion veriﬁcation) demands
remained identical in both conditions. No personal or self-referring
contents were presented and even animate agents were left out to
keep the propositional content as simple as possible and exclude
spontaneous social processes.
The pseudo-randomized experimental trials were interspersed
with ﬁller trials which consisted of the same ﬁrst sentence as the
counterfactual and hypothetical conditions (The motor is switched off
today.), a conditionalized repetition of the introduced event (If the
motor is switched off today,…), and the same question as both exper-
imental conditions (… does it burn fuel?). This third condition was
added to obscure the design from the subjects and prevent them
from using simple implicit strategies to solve the task (e.g. using the
temporal marker as a cue to condition), thus ensuring their attention
during sentences processing.
In total 54 different themes were used to construct the counterfac-
tual, hypothetical, and ﬁller trials. Each theme was presented once
per modality, therefore twice per subject, but always in different con-
ditions within a subject.
As illustrated in Fig. 1, the durations of presentation were 3000 ms
for the ﬁrst sentence, 5000 ms for the antecedent, and 3500 ms for
the consequent of the conditional interrogative sentence. In the visual
condition the three parts were presented successively, preventing
possible rereading of preceding information. Auditory presentation
onsets coincided with those of the visual presentation, but the dura-
tion of spoken sentences showed a natural variation due to different
lengths of the clauses. After the consequent which was framed as a
question, two letters (J and N corresponding to yes and no) appeared
for 1500 ms, prompting the subject to answer. Each trial was followed
by a ﬁxation-cross presented for 500 ms. Stimulus delivery and timing
were controlled with Presentation (Neurobehavioral Systems, Albany,
CA, USA). Three counterbalanced stimulus lists were employed in
each of which trials of every condition were pseudo-randomly mixedwith ﬁller and baseline trials, thus balancing the succession order of
identical trial types.
Procedure
The subjects were familiarized to the task prior to scanning. They
were instructed to read the visually presented sentences carefully
(or to listen to them in the auditory condition) and to answer the
questions with yes or no after the letters J and Nwould have appeared
on the screen. Subjects were encouraged to rely on their common
sense and world knowledge instead of logical or probabilistic con-
siderations. The visual stimuli were projected on a monitor located
behind the head and could be seen through a mirror apparatus on
top of the head coil. The auditory stimuli were presented via
MRI-compatible pneumatic earphones. A ﬁxation cross was presented
on the screen during auditory stimuli delivery. Behavioral responses
were collected with a two-button response box which the subjects
were holding in their right hand and pressing with two different
ﬁngers (index ﬁnger for afﬁrmation and middle ﬁnger for rejection).
Positive and negative answers were balanced within and between
conditions to prevent the use of low-level strategies and balance con-
founds of afﬁrmation/negation and ﬁnger use.
Design
A categorical design with two main conditions (counterfactual,
hypothetical) was employed for visual and auditory modality, resulting
in a 2×2within subject design. Functional imagingwas subdivided into
four sessions, two consecutive sessions per modality. Modality order
was counterbalanced across subjects. Each session included 36 trials,
9 per condition (counterfactual, hypothetical), 9 ﬁller, and 9 resting
baseline trials where only a ﬁxation cross was displayed for the length
of a trial and which were used as an implicit baseline. Per subject,
each of the 54 themeswas presented oncewithin amodality, but in dif-
ferent conditions (counterfactual, hypothetical, or ﬁller). A single trial
lasted 13 s, one session lasted 8.1 min and the whole functional exper-
iment took 32.4 min to acquire.
fMRI data acquisition
Functional and structural imaging was acquired with a Siemens
3 Tesla Tim-Trio Scanner, located at Christian-Doppler-Clinic, Salzburg.
Functional images sensitive to the BOLD contrast were obtained with
a T2*-weighted gradient echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequence (TR=
2250 ms; TE=30 ms; matrix size=64×64; voxel size=3×3×
3 mm; slice gap 0.3 mm; FOV=192×192 mm; ﬂip angle=70°). 36
axial slices were descendingly imaged parallel to the bicommissural
Table 2
Behavioral results.
Modality Condition
CF HYP
% Hit (SD) RT (SD) % Hit (SD) RT (SD)
Visual 96 (5) 640 (93) 96 (5) 635 (115)
Auditory 94 (8) 612 (109) 97 (5) 575 (141)
Both 95 (6) 626 (101) 97 (4) 605 (130)
Mean accuracy (percentage of hits) and reaction time (in milliseconds) over subjects for
counterfactual (CF) and hypothetical (HYP) conditions. Standard deviations are indicated
in brackets.
Table 3
Supra-modal whole brain activations for main effect of condition.
Region H MNI coordinates N voxel T(1,60) pFWE
x y z
CF>HYP Cuneus R 18 −73 10 82 4.49 0.01
9 −94 13
Caudate R 21 5 22 52 3.90 0.06
15 20 16
HYP>CF No activated clusters
Counterfactual (CF) and hypothetical (HYP). Signiﬁcant clusters are reported at pb .001,
the last column indicating signiﬁcance for FWE cluster level correction. H=hemisphere,
N=number, R=right.
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subject, four sessions, each one comprising 225 whole head images
including 6 dummy scans at the beginning, were acquired. In addition
to functional scanning, a high-resolution structural scan (T1-weighted
MP-RAGE sequence; TR=2300 ms; TE=2.81 ms; voxel size 1.2×1×
1 mm; slice-thickness=1.2 mm; FOV=240×256 mm; 160 slices;
ﬂip angle=9°) was acquired sagitally to facilitate normalization and
localization of functional data.
fMRI data processing
The fMRI data were processed using Statistical Parametrical
Mapping (SPM 8, Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience,
London, UK) software, implemented in a MATLAB 7.6 (Mathworks,
Sherborn, MA) runtime environment. Preprocessing was carried
out for every subject individually. First, all images were pre-co-
registered to an SPM8 EPI template. Functional data were then
realigned in order to correct movement artifacts. Distortions in EPI
caused by magnetic ﬁeld inhomogeneity were corrected by using
ﬁeld maps for unwarping. In the next steps, structural data were seg-
mented intowhite and graymatter and skull structureswere separated
from brain tissue. These steps were conducted in order to facilitate the
normalization of the structural image to standard MNI space (Montreal
Neurological Institute, McGill, Montreal, Canada). Last steps included
co-registration of themean functional scan to the structural data to nor-
malize them both to standard MNI space and smoothing the functional
data with an 8 mm full-width at half-maximum Gaussian kernel.
The preprocessed data were analyzed using a general linear model
(GLM) approach. Per subject, modality, and session, each trial (CF, HYP,
and ﬁller) wasmodeled as a boxcar functionwith the duration of 11.5 s
and convolved with a synthetic hemodynamic response function. The
response frame was modeled as an event of no interest. Movement
parameters were entered into the design matrix as additional regres-
sors. Low-frequency noise was removed by a ﬁlter with a cutoff of
128 s and serial correlations were taken into account using an autocor-
relation model AR(1). On the individual level, contrasts for CF and HYP
relative to implicit ﬁxation baseline were computed separately per
modality. We did not differentiate between unanswered, correctly and
incorrectly answered trials since errors and misses were very rare.
Data were taken on the second level and underwent a random
effects analysis to allow for population inference. We computed a
repeated-measures ANOVA by means of a full-factorial design follow-
ing the guidelines by Glascher and Gitelman (2008). Wemodeled two
factors (modality and condition) with two (visual, auditory) and two
(CF, HYP) levels, respectively. Whole brain results are reported using
an uncorrected threshold of pb0.001 with subsequent FWE cluster
level correction with pb0.05. ROI analysis was conducted with the
eigenvariate-tool of SPM8 using a non-repeated 2×2 design, averag-
ing the mean brain activity estimates of the clusters from the supra-
modal whole-level analysis. Since the only purpose of the ROI analysis
is to show that the reported effects are not driven by one modality,
we see no problematic circularity in this procedure.
Results
Behavioral results
Accuracy
The overall accuracy was high with around 95% (see Table 2). That
is a good indicator that subjects were attentive and understood the
task. We compared accuracy between modalities (auditory and visual)
and conditions (CF and HYP) by comparing subjects' percentage of hit-
rateswith a 2×2 repeatedmeasures ANOVA. Therewere nomain effects
or interaction (modality F(1, 20)=0.25, p=.62; condition F(1, 20)=
1.46, p=.24; interaction F(1, 20)=1.38, p=.26). This lack of signiﬁ-
cance indicates that the conditions were similar in difﬁculty.Reaction times
Reaction times for correct responses differed between conditions
(F(1, 20)=5.47, p=.03) but not modalities (F(1, 20)=3.21, p=.08),
with no signiﬁcant interaction (F(1, 20)=0.91, p=.35). Since the re-
action times were collected in response to the Y/N-cue to elongate con-
sequent evaluation, they may not reﬂect the actual time which was
needed to judge the acceptability of the conclusions but rathermeasure
the reaction time to the visually presented response cue. Nevertheless,
counterfactual elaboration slowed down reaction time to the presented
cue.
Imaging results
The contrast of interest was the comparison between counterfactual
and hypothetical conditions across modalities. Here we found signiﬁ-
cantly stronger activity in right occipital cortex (cuneus) andmarginally
signiﬁcant differences in right basal ganglia (caudate nucleus) on the
whole-brain level as the main effect of Counterfactual>Hypothetical
(see Table 3 for details). Post hoc t-tests showed that activation of
both clusters was signiﬁcantly stronger in the CF than in the HYP condi-
tion for each modality (cuneus visual t(1, 20)=5.68, pb .001; cuneus
auditory t(1, 20)=2.94, pb .01; caudate visual t(1, 20)=2.53, pb .05;
caudate auditory t(1, 20)=3.56, pb .01). It is especially noteworthy
that the effect in the cuneus cluster is also present during auditory stim-
ulus delivery (see Fig. 2). This rules out that the result is driven by
differential processes related to visual perception. Comparisons in the
opposite direction (HYP>CF) did not reveal any signiﬁcant clusters.
Themain effect ofmodality (Visual>Auditory)was found in a predom-
inantly left lateralized network which is typically found in visual word
and sentence processing studies (Schurz et al., 2010). Stronger activa-
tion was found in bilateral occipital and occipito-temporal areas, as
well as bilateral inferior and superior parietal areas. A large left frontal
cluster was present, including inferior frontal gyrus and precentral
gyrus. In the right frontal cortex, relatively small areas of stronger acti-
vation for visual compared to auditory sentence processingwere found.
The contrast in the other direction (Auditory>Visual) revealed activa-
tions in bilateral auditory cortices as well as large portions of bilateral
temporal cortices, mainly including middle and superior temporal
Fig. 2. Visualization of imaging results. A: Cuneus cluster from the supra-modal contrast CF>HYP projected on a single-subject structural image (Single T1 provided by the standard
SPM software package); B:Mean brain activity estimates (given in arbitrary units) of the cuneus cluster, plotted individually permodality. Error bars indicate 2 SEwhich approximates
a conﬁdence interval of 95%.
269E. Kulakova et al. / NeuroImage 72 (2013) 265–271gyri (see supplementary information for further details). No signiﬁcant
interaction effect was observed.
Discussion
In our task subjects were processing counterfactual conditionals in
which they had to revise the consequence of assumed events. They
were informed what was true in the real world, which made the
antecedents of counterfactual conditionals explicitly contradicting
stated facts. We contrasted this condition to hypothetical conditionals
where subjects also knew the facts but were to think about a different
hypothetical event which did not directly contradict the previously
stated information.We argued that this condition provides the relevant
contrast for identifying the neural correlates speciﬁcally involved in
counterfactual thinking, since it controls for the if–then sentence struc-
ture and the ontological status of imagined events (both being supposi-
tional, not factual), only differing from counterfactuals with respect to
its antagonism to the factual event.
We found a neural difference between both conditions, namely
right-lateralized activation in cuneus and (marginally) in the nucleus
caudatus in the supra-modal contrast Counterfactual (CF)>Hypothetical
(HYP). Stronger cuneus activation in CF was also present when stimuli
were presented aurally, which is a strong indication that the observed
difference builds on cognitive processeswhich differ between conditions
but not modalities and therefore are not related to primary visual per-
ception. Caudate activation was unexpected, but ﬁts well with existing
data on language comprehension and reasoning.
The role of occipital cortex
Occipital regions might be associated with the construction of a
visual scene in absence of the appropriate external stimulus, a cogni-
tive process which is called ‘mental imagery’ (Thomas, 2010) and is a
subcomponent of scene construction, the process of mentally generating
and maintaining a complex and coherent scene (Hassabis et al., 2007).
For our purposes we want to emphasize that these scenes may
be intentionally created accompanied by a clear phenomenology ofvisualization (as the terminology suggests) but they could also be auto-
matic processes triggered by counterfactual sentence comprehension
lacking any conscious phenomenology of visualization. Summerﬁeld
et al. (2010) investigated scene construction by aurally presenting
three-word descriptions of items which had to be incorporated into
visually imagined scenes. Despite a non-visual presentation mode with
closed eyes, occipital regions were activated bilaterally, more strongly
during the imagination of the second scene element than during the
ﬁrst one and activation was even stronger when subjects were adding
a third element to the imagined scene.
Two complementary explanations for higher imagery demands in
the CF task are on hand. First, a visual load effect is possible. The broader
and more complex the constructed scene becomes, the more occipital
activation is required to capture it, akin to visual perception load. Alter-
natively, integration of a new visual element in the existing scene may
be in some way more demanding and need additional resources. In-
deed, both load and integration processes might be involved.Occipital cortex and mental imagery load
In our stimulus material imagery load was matched by explicitly
providing the same propositional information (motor off, motor on,
fuel burned) in both experimental conditions. Therefore it seems at
ﬁrst sight implausible that CF neededmore complex scenes. However,
previously reported reasoning and text processing studies make it
conceivable that the counterfactual antecedent reactivated the previ-
ously stated real world model and made it more salient to subjects
whereas the hypothetical conditional signaled the move to a new
and independent supposition and consequently did not cause such
reactivation and ampliﬁcation of factual events. In our contrast of
interest the activations due to the representation of the suppositions
canceled out, whereas the neural activity associated with the repre-
sentation of the factual model did not. Our paradigm cannot show
that the mere use of subjunctive mood triggers the representation
of the actual state of the world since this information was explicitly
provided in the stimuli. Nevertheless, the stronger cuneus activation
indicates a more pronounced visual representation in the CF than
270 E. Kulakova et al. / NeuroImage 72 (2013) 265–271the HYP condition, which is well compatible with predictions based
on mental model theory.
Occipital cortex and integration effect
The possibility of an effect of integration, however, remains possi-
ble and appears fairly plausible in the light of recent ﬁndings from the
reasoning literature. Reasoning investigations use similar stimuli to
our paradigm and occipital activations are frequently found but rarely
discussed because frontal and parietal ﬁndings are more canonical.
In his review Goel (2007) shows that more than half of reasoning
studies yield occipital activation in differential contrasts. More evi-
dence has accumulated since then and helps to pinpoint potential
causes. Some occipital effects can be attributed to differences in read-
ing behavior and sentence-length, especially when verbal reasoning
content is presented visually. Other ﬁndings rule out primary percep-
tive differences through auditory presentation but are compatible
with a mental imagery load interpretation (Just et al., 2004). This is
especially likely when contrasts between concrete and abstract con-
tent (Knauff et al., 2003) or contrasts between spatial and conditional
tasks (Knauff et al., 2002) are reported. However, there are some
occipital ﬁndings from reasoning studies with verbal content which
control for these variables and therefore need additional explanation.
For instance, Prado et al. (2010) found stronger bilateral middle
occipital activations during valid deduction from integrable argu-
ments using Modus Tollens inference than during the processing of
non-integrable control statements about shapes in a self-paced rea-
soning study with visual presentation mode. In integrable arguments
both premises had one object in common (There is not a circle. If there
is a triangle then there is a circle.) and therefore implied a conclusion
(There is no triangle.). Non-integrable arguments had no common
object in the second sentence (There is not a circle. If there is a triangle
then there is a diamond.), which prevented any valid deduction. This
integration effect cannot be reduced to perceptual differences be-
tween conditions, since sentences differed only in one word, which
is also a reason why differential complexity of evoked images is
unlikely to account for the observed differences. The integration
effect is quite common in the reasoning literature. Goel and Dolan
(2004) ﬁnd bilateral occipital (and L putamen) contribution to induc-
tive and deductive reasoning when compared to reading of three
unrelated sentences in bilateral occipital cortex, and bilateral caudate
for reasoning with concrete (Karen is in front of Larry) as well as
abstract (K is in front of L) three-term relations (Goel and Dolan,
2001) compared to non-integrable statements.
One can conclude that integration of sentences in a single coher-
ent and informative discourse model has often been associated with
occipital activations. This supports the second interpretation of our
results, namely effort due to successful integration. We also see that
in most cases of integration, occipital activation occurs together with
effects in the basal ganglia, and this is our only other main ﬁnding for
the contrast CF>HYP.
Role of basal ganglia
Basal ganglia, especially in the left hemisphere, are an established
part of the language-processing network as Friederici (2006) has
emphasized. Basal ganglia seem to play a major role in controlled as-
pects of language processing when inhibition of preferred representa-
tions is required (Bornkessel-Schlesewsky and Schlesewsky, 2009).
Longworth et al. (2005) put forward a non-language speciﬁc hypoth-
esis of striatum contribution in language: suppression of competing
alternatives during the late integrational processes in comprehension.
Basal ganglia and integration
It is intriguing that most reasoning investigations that contrasted
integration with unrelated sentences show basal ganglia activations
(Goel et al., 2000; Parsons and Osherson, 2001; Reverberi et al.,2010; in addition to the ones mentioned above). This is evidence
that basal ganglia contribute to successful integration of linguistic
information, be it within or between sentences. If such integration
processes in sentence comprehension depend mostly on left basal
ganglia, we hypothesize that right basal ganglia, as observed in our
case, are contributing to the successful integration of two distinct
and incompatible represented states of the world into one discourse
model. This idea is inspired by the coarse coding-hypothesis (Beeman,
1998; Jung-Beeman, 2005) which assumes that the right hemisphere
allows broader associations (for comprehending metaphors, deriving
themes, understanding jokes), while the left hemisphere is more rele-
vant for narrow, canonical meanings of words. Apparently, the integra-
tion of non-verbal, iconically presented spatial relations activates right
rather than left basal ganglia, as found by Fangmeier et al. (2006) during
premise integration when reasoning about the spatial relations of
letters. Similar integration effort is needed in our task to keep in mind
both mentally represented states (motor on andmotor off).
Basal ganglia and truth evaluation
Another domain in which basal ganglia activation has been consis-
tently reported is truth evaluation. Factually false sentences show
increased right (Menenti et al., 2009) or bilateral caudate activation
when compared to true statements (Nieuwland, 2012). It is interest-
ing that the same effect is not present when counterfactual local con-
text modiﬁes truth values (Nieuwland, 2012), maybe because here
both types of sentences (counterfactual true and counterfactual
false) are false in respect to the real world. Since in our task counter-
factual antecedents were false whereas hypothetical ones were not,
the caudate ﬁnding is consistent with the literature. The truth-value
contrast is furthermore comparable to the integration effect of in-
compatible models in the case of counterfactuals. In both cases the in-
coming propositional information cannot easily be incorporated in a
single world model but needs alternative models to represent all in-
formation for a coherent discourse. So it is remarkable that represen-
tations of false statements and of counterfactual antecedents activate
basal ganglia preferentially in the right hemisphere.
Basal ganglia and linguistic mood
On a lower level our results can be interpreted as effects of the dif-
ferential use of subjunctive and indicative mood. As the manipulation
of mood resulted in different structures of the verb-phrase, we might
have found correlates of mood processing on a supra-modal neural
level. This possibility would ﬁt well the role of basal ganglia reported
in language research, especially with syntactic complexity (Hagoort,
2003). However, its right lateralization is at odds with established
linguistic theories and therefore ﬁts better to our semantic integra-
tion interpretation. However, subjunctive mood and counterfactuality
can only be dissociated with a paradigm that avoids the use of the
subjunctive–indicative contrast for comparing CF and HYP condi-
tionals, which is a difﬁcult task to accomplish.
Conclusion
Our results show that counterfactual and hypothetical conditional
processing differs in BOLD-responses in the right cuneus and margin-
ally in the right caudate nucleus. These results cannot be trivially
explained by basic perceptual processes or by differences in proposi-
tional content because they occur on a supra-modal level and be-
tween conditions closely matched in respect to conveyed content.
Our favored explanation is that they reﬂect representational process-
es which differ between counterfactual and hypothetical conditionals.
Counterfactual (subjunctive) conditionals imply the continued rele-
vance of factual and suppositional information, suggesting that one
should keep both in mind. In contrast, the hypothetical conditional
suggests a switch from the foregoing real world information to a hypo-
thetical scenario, suggesting that one can ignore the earlier information
271E. Kulakova et al. / NeuroImage 72 (2013) 265–271for the new task at hand. The double representation of the counterfac-
tual as proposed by mental model theory draws on increased implicit
mental imagery resources as well as increased integration effort for
creating a coherent discourse. Whether the increased uniﬁcation effort
is mainly driven by a propositional contradiction of factual and supposed
events on a representational level (model interpretation) or reﬂects the
use of subjunctivemood on a lower, syntactic level (language interpreta-
tion) remains to be clariﬁed in further investigations.
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